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We develop a tractable  general theory for the study of the economic and demographic impact of epidemics, and 
notably its distributional consequences. To this end, we develop a three-period overlapping generations model 
where  altruistic  parents  choose  optimal  health  expenditures  for  their  children  and  themselves.  The  survival 
probability of (junior) adults and children depends on such investments. Agents can be skilled or unskilled. The 
model  emphasizes the role of orphans. Orphans are not only penalized in the face of death, they  are also 
penalized in the access to education. Epidemics are modeled as one period exogenous shocks to the survival 
rates. We specifically study the consequence of a negative shock on adult survival rates in the first period.  We 
prove that while the epidemic has no permanent effect on income distribution, it can perfectly alter it in the short 
and  medium  run.  In  particular,  the  epidemic  may  imply  a  worsening  in  the  short  and  medium  run  of  both 
economic performance and income distribution. Two opposite mechanisms are isolated: first, the survival  rate of 
children at the end of the first period decreases relatively more in poor than in wealthy families. This decreases 
the proportion of junior adults with a low endowment of human capital in period 2. Secondly, the number of 
orphans  in  period  1  increases  in  both  families.  This  decreases  the  proportion  of  junior  adults  with  a  low 
endowment of human capital in period 2.  Therefore, the proportion of the unskilled will necessarily  increase in 
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1.  Introduction 
The  study  of  the  economic  effects  of  epidemics  has  always  been  of  interest  to  many 
economists (see for example Hirshleifer, 1987). Recently, the topic has regained interest and 
has become an important research area due to two main factors. On one hand, the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic and its apparent massive demographic effects, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, has 
suggested an exceptionally abundant literature, overwhelmingly empirical (see among many 
others, Bloom and Mahal, 1997, or McDonald and Roberts, 2006). On the other hand, the rise 
of a so-called ``unified growth theory’’ (comprehensively surveyed by Galor, 2005), specially 
concerned with the understanding of the Malthusian stagnation and the determinants of the 
transition to the modern growth regime, has led to reconsider the role of epidemics in the 
development process (see Lagerlof, 2003). 
 
Just like the Black Death has been viewed as a major engine of the transformation of the West 
in  the  Middle-Ages  by  prominent  historians  and  sociologists  (see  Herlihy,  1997),  several 
recent  contributions  are  taking  this  avenue  in  the  assessment  of  AIDS  socio-economic 
consequences  on  Sub-Saharan  Africa  (among  them,  Young,  2005).  While  the  short  term 
effects of such pandemics are most harmful in all respects, the long-run are not that clear. As 
argued by Young (2005), the latter can be much less disastrous, and even favourable, if the 
wage effect induced by (huge) labor supply falls ends up decreasing fertility (via increased 
female  participation  in  the  labor  market). Yet this view is not unanimously accepted. No 
empirical study has identified so far a sizeable wage effect in Sub-Saharan Africa although  
more recent papers by Young (2007)  and Boucekkine, Desbordes and Latzer (2008) conclude 
that HIV is lowering fertility in the area. Kalemli-Ozcan (2006) defends the opposite view. 
She suggests that the impact of AIDS on fertility might even go the other way as a result of an 
insurance effect.
4 
This paper sheds light on another side of epidemics, namely their distributional consequences 
both in the short, medium and long-run.  In the main mortality crises studied (Black Death, 
Spanish flu or AIDS), death affects more the adult population of working age than younger or 
                                                 
4 The same debate takes place on the Black Death disaster. Among them, Robbins (1928) argued that  ``…the 
English villein, lured by the prospects of high wages in neighboring towns, must sooner or later have deserted 
his manor. The plague …furnished him an excuse’’.   2 
older  populations.  Yet,  when  young  adults  die,  not  only  do  they  reduce  the  amount  of 
productive labour and human capital, but they also leave orphans behind them, potentially 
leading to disastrous consequences: ``… Orphaning rates above 5% worry UNICEF because 
they exceed the capacity of local communities to care for parentless children. So do places 
such as Zambia, where almost 12% of children are AIDS orphans…. Orphans tend to be 
poorer than non orphans, and to face a higher risk of malnutrition, stunting and death — even 
if they are free of HIV themselves. Orphans are less likely to attend school because they 
cannot afford the fees but also because step-parents tend to educate their own children first”.
5  
 
As noted by Case, Paxson and Ableidinger (2004), orphans use to live in foster families who 
discriminate against them and in favour of the children of the family head. The probability of 
the school enrolment of an orphan is inversely proportional to the degree of relatedness of the 
child to the household head. Gertler, Levine and Martinez (2003) show that parental loss does 
not operate only through a reduction in household resources. Parental presence, including the 
loss of mentoring, the transmission of values and emotional and psychological support, plays 
an important role in investment in child human capital. All these findings are consistent with 
the broader view that the amount of human capital (education and health) embodied in a 
person strongly results from decisions taken by his parents, as documented by Bowles and 
Gentis (2002) quoting a series of empirical results for the United States. Grawe and Mulligan 
(2002) review cross-country evidence showing that countries with lower public provision of 
human  capital  experience  smaller  intergenerational  mobility.  The  connection  between  the 
absence  of  intergenerational  mobility  and  education  is  also  well  documented  (see  again, 
Bowles and Gentis and Case, Lubotsky and Paxson, 2001).  
Our model is completely on this line. In order to isolate the short, medium and long-term 
distributional impact of orphans, we shut down the wage and fertility channels, abundantly 
commented  in  the  recent  AIDS  literature.  People  live  for  three  periods,  successively  as 
children, junior adults and senior adults. A junior adult has an exogenous number of children 
and is perfectly altruistic in that he only cares for the survival of his children and the social 
position they will get. He invests in his own health and education, and in the health and 
education of his children. The probabilities of survival of a child and of a junior adult depend 
on the amounts of money spent by the junior adult for his own human capital and for the one 
                                                 
5 The Economist (2003) – “AIDS. A mixed prognosis”, November 29
th, 87-89. 
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of his children. So, under imperfect credit markets, health and education spending and the 
probabilities of survival will be low if parents are poor.  Moreover, if a parent dies and if his 
children become orphans, their probabilities of survival will be lowered. Finally, an orphan 
has a lower probability to reach a high level of human capital than a child brought up by living 
parents.  Accordingly,  a  key  feature  of  the  paper  is  to  consider  a  crucial  dimension  of 
inequality, namely inequality in the face of death. Inequality between children has several 
causes.  First,  the  children  of  less  educated  parents  who  have  survived  have  a  higher 
probability of dying before growing adults because their parents spend less on their health and 
education. Secondly, less educated parents spend less on their own education and health and 
have a higher probability to die and to be unable to bring their children up.  
 
Relation to the literature 
Very few theoretical papers have been devoted so far to investigating the links between health 
spending,  mortality  and  the  persistence  of  inequality  across  generations.  Two  important 
contributions are Chakraborty and Das (2005) and Bell and Gersbach (2008).
6  The former 
base their analysis on the fact that poor parents invest less in their own health and so have a 
high probability of dying. Thus, they save little and leave a small bequest to their children if 
they survive and a still smaller bequest if they die. The paper assumes that parents only care 
for their children if they are themselves alive when their children grow. An extension of the 
paper  introduces the possibility of investing, not only in the health of parents, but in the 
education  of  children  too.  The  productivity  of  labour  depends  on both these investments. 
Nonetheless, these authors do not consider investments in the health of children nor their 
survival  probability.  Our  model  does  incorporate  the  latter  critical  aspect.  Moreover,  the 
demographic and economic properties of the model are fully analytically investigated in the 
short, medium and long-run, which is already a contribution to the literature.  
Bell and Gersbach’s paper (2008) shares one of the main objectives of ours, that is the study 
of human capital transmission across generations under epidemics. Interestingly, these authors 
consider a two- parents model, which in turn allows them to distinguish between the case of 
full orphans (with no surviving parent) and orphans with one surviving parent. However, in 
contrast to Chakraborty and Das (2005) and to our model, no health investment is explicitly 
                                                 
6 Note however that some applied papers on AIDS do comment on the role of orphans and on the induced 
changes in the distributions of human capital and income possibly following the epidemic although they do not 
aim to theoretically investigate them. See for example the computable general equilibrium models elaborated by 
Bell, Devarajan and Gersbach (2003) and Corrigan, Glomm and Mendez (2004).    4 
considered, the survival probabilities and epidemiological dynamics being fully exogenous. 
Nonetheless, within a somewhat sophisticated dynamic structure, the authors are able to bring 
out  several  useful  conclusions  on  the  distributional impact of epidemics under alternative 
family arrangements.  
The paper is organised as follows. The second section presents the model and its short run 
equilibrium.  The  third  section  is  devoted  to  the  transitory  dynamics  and  the  long  run 
equilibrium  of  demographic  variables.  The  fourth  section  investigates  the  economic  and 
demographic effects of epidemics. The fifth section concludes. 
2. The model: behaviour of the agents and temporary equilibrium 
We  consider  a  discrete  time,  perfect  foresight  dynamic  model  of  a  small  open  economy. 
People live for three periods, successively as children, junior adults and senior adults. We will 
start by examining the choices of a junior adult in a given period denoted  t. To ease the 
exposition and to be able to bring out a fully analytical characterization,  we shall refer to a 
single  good,  health  care.  The  latter  should  be  taken  in  the  much  broader  sense  of  any 
investment raising human capital (including education).  
 
2.1. The choices of a junior adult 
A junior adult enters period t with an endowment in human capital h. Healthcare is the only 
good  existing  in  the  economy.  It is produced by firms, which use human capital as their 
unique input and which operate under constant returns. We will assume that the productivity 
of human capital is equal to 1 and that firms make no profit. Thus,  h can also be interpreted 
as the earnings of the agent. The healthcare good can be stored without cost. The agent sets his 
saving (his storage of healthcare good)  s and his investment in health l for the period, under 
the budget constraint  
(1)  l s h + =  
Spending on health has an effect on the lifetime of the agent. His probability of being alive in 
period  1 + t   (as  a  senior  adult)  is  ) (l p .  At  the  end  of  period  t  the  agent  will  have  an 
exogenous  number  n  of  children.  Senior  adults  receive  no  wages.  This  assumption  will 
simplify the model in directions that we are not very interested to investigate. The agent will 
invest  1 + e  in the health of each of his children. The probability for each of them to be alive at 
the beginning of period  2 + t  will depend on this investment. If the agent is alive in period   5 
1 + t  and can take care of his children, this probability will be  ) ( 1 + e l . If he is dead and if his 
children  are  orphans,  this  probability  will  be  ) ( 1 + e cl ,  with  1 0 < £ < c c .    The  budget 
constraint of the agent in period  1 + t  is: 
(2) 
1 + = ne s  
Notice that the amount invested by the agent in the health of his children will be the same if 
the agent dies or stays alive at the end of period  t. This investment is equal to the saving 
made in period t. The intertemporal budget constraint of the agent is 
(3) 
1 + + = ne l h  
To simplify the model, we will assume that human capital can take only two values:  1 h  and 
2 h , with:  2 1 0 h h < < . We will assume that a child who has living parents and who stays alive 
has a probability  p  of obtaining a human capital of 
2 h  and a probability  p - 1  of obtaining a 
human capital of 
1 h . An orphan who stays alive has the probability  q of obtaining the high 
level of human capital and  q - 1  of obtaining the low level of human capital. We assume that 
1 0 £ < £ p q . 
Our junior adult has the following utility function in period t  
(4)  [ ] [ ] [ ] { }
1 1 2 1 1 2
1 ) ( ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( h h h q c l h h h p l e n U + - - + + - º + n p n p l  
The junior adult is wholly altruistic. His utility only depends on the expected human capital 
accumulated by his children who will reach the adult age. Our specification is in the spirit of 
evolutionary biology (see Galor and Moav, 2002 and 2005). Consistently with the traditional 
Darwinian theory, the parent should maximize the probability of survival and quality of her 
children. Nonetheless, in contrast to Galor and Moav (2005), we keep the number of offspring 
fixed. As argued in the introduction, our paper intends to isolate the role of orphans, and to 
this  end,  we  shut  down  the  wage  and  fertility  channels  abundantly  commented  in  the 
literature.  On  the  other  hand,  adding  endogenous  fertility  to  the  model  would  require 
additional adjustments which will reduce sharply its tractability.  
If the junior adult reaches the age of senior adult, he will bring his children up, which will 
increase their probability of survival and their expected levels of human capital.  2 h n  (
1 h n ) 
represents the satisfaction a child brings to his parent when he reaches the adult age with the 
level of human capital 
2 h  (
1 h ),  0 > n . When the child dies, this satisfaction is 0. We will 
introduce the following notations 
(5)  [ ]
1 1 2
1 ) ( h h h p r + - =n ,  [ ]
1 1 2
2 ) ( h h h q c r + - =n  and  1 / 2 1 - = r r r .   6 
The  utility  function  of  our  junior  adult  in  period  t  becomes,  after  removing  a  constant 
multiplicative term,  [ ] 1 ) ( ) ( 1 + º + r l e U p l .  r  represents the satisfaction premium brought by 
children when their parent stays alive, or if one prefers, the utility for parents of staying alive. 
In  this  case,  the probability of survival of each child is higher (by a factor  c / 1 ) and his 
expected level of human capital is higher too. r , is an increasing function of the inequality in 
earnings, 
1 1 2 / ) ( h h h - , which is expected for the next period. Finally, our junior adult must 
solve in period t the program 
(6)  [ ] 1 ) ( ) ( 1 , 1
+ +
+
r l e Max
e l p l  
1 + + = ne l h  
0 , 1 ³ + e l  
Before solving this program we must give precise specifications of the survival functions:  
(7)   { } 1 ), 1 /( ) ' ( min ) (
1
1 1 a l
a - + =
-
+ + A Ae e  
 (8)  { } 1 ), 1 /( ) ' ( min ) (
1 b p
b - + =
- B Bl l  
with:  1 , 0 < < a b ,  0 ' , , > B B A ,  ( )
) 1 /( 1 1 ' 0
a a
- - < £ A ,   ( )
) 1 /( 1 1 '
b b
- - < B .  .  
In the rest of the paper we will assume that we are always inside the intervals where both 
functions are strictly increasing. Some comments are in order here. Concerning the concave 
functional forms considered, empirical evidence is quite compelling: among others, Deaton 
(2003) notices that health spending, the health state and the longevity of an individual are 
increasing and concave functions of his income: for instance the probability of dying between 
the ages of 50 and 60 is a decreasing convex function of his income. This concavity is a 
possible explanation of the impact of inequality on the average health state in a country, and it 
implies that some redistribution of income can increase average health.  
Second,  we  consider  survival  functions  such  that  0 ) 1 /( ' ) 0 (
1 ³ - =
- a l
a A   and    = ) 0 ( p  
) 1 /( '
1 b
b -
- B >0. Chakraborty and Das (2005) assume that their survival probability drops to 
zero with zero investment in health. It is easy to justify why survival rates need not be zero 
when health investment is zero: l(0) or p(0) can simply be interpreted as reflecting inherent 
(and exogenous) health situations, unrelated to health investments (see Finlay, 2005). This 
specification is not only aimed to generalize the analytical framework, it is a fundamental 
ingredient of our theory. To get an immediate idea of it, consider the efficiency of adults’ 
health spending, that is the derivative of their probability of survival with respect to health   7 
spending,  ( ) ( )
b p
- + = ¶ ¶ ' / B Bl B l l . Notice that it is decreasing in the investment, which is 
reasonable. Moreover, we have: 
( ) ( ) [ ]( ) 0 ' ' 1 ) /(
1 2 > + + - = ¶ ¶ ¶
- - b b p B Bl B Bl B l l ,  ( ) ( ) 0 ' ) ' /(
1 2 < + - = ¶ ¶ ¶
- - b b p B Bl B B l l , 
that is the marginal efficiency of investment does not respond in the same way to shocks on B 
or  B’.  Henceforth,  mortality  crises  have  completely  different  consequences  depending  on 
whether  they  operate  through  B,  B’  or  both.  Boucekkine  and  Laffargue  (2008)  provide  a 
complete characterization of the model dynamics in all these cases, and also consider child 
mortality crises (shocks on A and A’).  
In this paper, we take a more specific view. While an epidemic can be defined as a decrease in 
one of the parameters of the survival functions, we will focus on the epidemics which hit 
junior adults by shifting downward their survival function, that is by decreasing the value of 
parameter  ' B . The epidemic essentially affects inherent health, nothing can be done against 
the epidemic itself, although an increase in health spending will reduce the number of death 
toll.  Though  our  theory  allows  for  any  age  profile  of  mortality,  we  shall  abstract  from 
exogenous  child  mortality  here  for  simplicity.  This  is  consistent  with  the  W-shaped  age-
profile of mortality observed for major epidemics like the Spanish flu or AIDS: the mortality 
impact of the epidemic is much stronger on junior adults than on children. Last, we consider 
that  the  epidemic  hits  people  irrespectively  of  their  endowment  in  human  capital.  This 
assumption is certainly debatable. There are indications that people with a relatively high 
schooling level are more exposed to AIDS because they have more sexual partners (Cogneau 
and Grimm, 2005). However these people are usually more aware of the risks of AIDS than 
less educated people and understand faster the usefulness of not engaging in risky behaviour.
7 
In this paper, we implicitly assume that the two effects offset each other.  
Hereafter, we assume A’=0 to simplify the algebra. With the survival functions given above, 
program (6) becomes 









B Bl r Ae Max
e l
 
1 + + = ne lR Rh  
0 , 1 ³ + e l ,   ( )




+ - £ Ae ,  ( )
) 1 /( 1 1 '
b b
- - £ + B Bl  
 
                                                 
7 For instance they are more responsive to campaigns of information, and prevention (de Walque, 2004).The 
United Nations (2004) quotes several studies showing that poor and uneducated people are more likely to engage 
in risky behaviour and to acquire HIV/AIDS   8 
We make the following assumptions. 
Assumption 1. The parameters of the model must satisfy the constraints 
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These assumptions are needed for the optimization problem to make sense, as established in 
the following lemma. In particular, condition (12) is needed for existence: the low value of 
human capital should be large enough for an optimal (interior) solution to exist. Conditions 
(10)  and  (11)  guarantee  that  optimal  decisions  lie  inside  the  intervals  where  the  survival 
functions are strictly increasing. They set upper bounds for p(
2 h ) and l(
2 h ) respectively. 
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Proof. Equation (14) is the constraint in program (9). We use this constraint to eliminate  1 + e  
from the objective function.  This function is concave in  l. Equation (14) is the first order 
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B Bl . Thus, 
equation (13) defines a unique value for l, which is positive and smaller than h.  
We  have  to  check  that  this  solution  satisfies  ( )
) 1 /( 1 1 '
b b
- - £ + B Bl .  This  is  equivalent  to 
( ) [ ] ) 1 /( ) 1 ( 1 ' / 1
) 1 /( 1 b a b
b - - + £ - -
- B B y  , which results from inequality (10). We also have 
to  check  that  ( )
) 1 /( 1
1 1 / ) (
a a
-
+ - £ - = n l h A Ae   or  ( ) A n h l / 1
) 1 /( 1 a a
- - - ³ .  This  condition  is 
satisfied because of inequality (11). □ 
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The three following lemmas describe in detail the characteristics of optimal decisions taken by 
a junior adult, first concerning investment in his own health, then concerning investment in 
the health of his offspring.  
 
Lemma 2. a) A junior adult endowed with high human capital invests more in his health than 
a junior adult endowed with low human capital. b) The investment of a junior adult in his own 
health increases with the utility for parents of being alive. c) The investment of a junior adult 
in his own health is independent of the number of his children. 
 
Lemma 3. a) A junior adult endowed with high human capital invests more in the health of 
his children than a junior adult endowed with low human capital. b) The investment of a 
junior adult in the health of his children decreases with the utility for parents of being alive. 
c) The total investment of a junior adult in the health of his children is independent of the 
number of his children.  
 
Lemma 4. a) The investment of a junior adult in his own health increases in case of epidemic 
(when parameter  ' B  decreases).  
b) However, his probability of survival decreases by 
(15)  ( )
( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
0 '
















































 c) The probability of survival of a junior adult decreases relatively less for those endowed 
with a high human capital than for those endowed with a low human capital. 
d) The investment of a junior adult in the health of his children decreases in case of epidemic. 
e) The probability of survivals of his children decreases by  
 (16)   ( )
( )
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f) The probability of survival of a child decreases relatively less if his parent is endowed with 
high human capital than if his parent is endowed with low human capital. 
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Proof.  We deduce from equation (14) 
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, which is a decreasing function of l, and so of 
h. Thus  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 1 1 / / l l d l l d p p p p < . Then we substitute equation (13) in this expression.  
 
We deduce from equation (7) and (14):  ( )



















1 . We substitute in 
the right-hand side of this equation the expression of dl  given above and get equation (15). If 
we remind that  1 + = - ne l h , and that  l and  1 + e  increase with  h (lemma 2 and 3), then, the 
factor  of  ' dB   in  equation  (16)  is  a  decreasing  function  of  h.  Thus 








1 / / + + + + < e d e d e e d l l l l .￿ 
 
The  model  has  several  worth-mentioning  properties.  First,  and  as  announced  in  the 
introduction section, our model entails inequality in the face of death. Children of parents with 
low human capital have a higher probability of dying before growing. Moreover, such parents 
tend to spend less in their own health care, and hence face a lower survival probability with 
the subsequent negative effect on the human capital of the resulting orphans.  Second, the 
investment decisions taken by the junior adults are sensitive to exogenous changes in their 
survival function (lemma 4). Put in other words, an epidemic hitting young adults will have an 
impact on the investment decisions of these individuals.  
The consequences of varying life expectancy are extensively studied in the literature. Our 
model has some interesting predictions regarding this issue. In the standard theory relying on 
Blanchard-Yaari  structures,  life  expectancy  (or  mortality  rate)  is  exogenous.  A  downward 
shift  in  life  expectancy  generally  decreases  the  marginal  return  to  investment  in  this   11 
framework, implying less investment in human capital (as in Boucekkine, de la Croix and 
Licandro, 2002). In our model life expectancy is no longer exogenous. When an epidemic hits 
a generation of junior adults, these individuals increase their own health expenditures and 
decrease health expenditures on their children. The first decision dampens, but is insufficient 
to reverse the effects of the epidemic and junior adults’ life expectancy decreases. The second 
decision reduces the probability of survival of their children.  
Lemma 4 also establishes that under epidemics the probability of survival of junior adults 
decreases proportionally less for those endowed with high human capital than for those with 
low human capital. This comes from the fact that the efficiency of health spending increases 
in the period of the epidemic shock, and that this spending is higher for junior adults with a 
high endowment of human capital. However, as the probability of survival of these junior 
adults is also higher, we do not know if the absolute reduction of their probability of survival 
is smaller or larger than for junior adults with low human capital. Similarly, the probability of 
survival  of  children  decreases  proportionally  less  if  their  parents  are  endowed  with  high 
human capital than when they are endowed with low human capital. 
Finally, total investment of a junior adult in the health of his children is independent of the 
number of his children. If this investment were to increase with the number of children, then 
health  expenditures  on  parents  would  go  down,  which  would  decrease  their  survival 
probability and increase the number of orphans. Transferring health spending from children to 
parents can neither be optimal: health spending per child would decrease first because total 
health spending on children goes down, secondly because there are more children. In our 
model, the two mechanisms outlined above exactly neutralize each other. 
 
2.2. Demographic variables 
The population alive in period  t  includes  21 N  and  22 N  junior adults with human capital 
endowments respectively equal to  1 h  and  2 h . It also includes 
31 N  and 
32 N  senior adults. 
Finally, it includes  11 N ,  12 N  children who have parents with respective human capital   1 h  
and  2 h , and   1 1o N ,   2 1o N orphans with respectively low and high bequests. The parents of the 
two first kinds of children are the senior adults of the period. So, we have: 
(17)  31 11 nN N =  and   32 12 nN N =  
The populations  1 1o N ,  2 1o N ,  21 N ,  22 N ,  31 N  and  32 N  are predetermined in period  t. The 
number of senior adults endowed with low (high) human capital which will be alive in period   12 
1 + t  is equal to the number of junior adults with the same endowment who are alive in period 
t multiplied by their rate of survival  
(18)  21 1 31
1 ) ( N l N p = + ,  22 2 32
1 ) ( N l N p = + ,   





1 + + - = nN nN N
o  and  32
1
22 2 1
1 + + - = nN nN N
o   
The numbers of junior adults with high and low human capital endowment in period  1 + t  
are respectively 
(20)  ( ) ( )
2 1 12 2 1 1 11 1 22
1 ) ( ) (
o o qcN pN e qcN pN e N + + + = + l l , 
       ( ) ( )
22
1
2 1 12 2 1 1 11 1 21
1 ) ( ) ( + + - + + + = N cN N e cN N e N
o o l l  
 
3. Dynamics and long run equilibrium 
3.1. The dynamics of populations 
There are  21 N  and  22 N  junior adults alive in period  0 ³ t . They will have  n children each. 
These children will either become  21
2 + N  and  21
2 + N  junior adults with earnings respectively equal 
to  1 h  and  2 h  in period  2 + t , or they will die at the end of period  1 + t . 
2 + D  represents the 
supplementary number of junior adults who would exist in period t if no children die before 
reaching the age of junior adult, that is if the survival rate function l  were identical to 1. We 
will investigate the dynamics of the model for  2 ³ t . The states of the economy in periods 0 















































































with                                    [ ] { }) ) 1 ( ) ( 1 ) 1 )( ( ) (
1 1 1
1 11 q c l p l e a - - + - = + p p l  
     [ ] { } ) 1 ( ) ( 1 ) 1 )( ( ) (
2 2 2
1 12 q c l p l e a - - + - = + p p l  
                                            [ ] { } cq l p l e a ) ( 1 ) ( ) (
1 1 1
1 21 p p l - + = +  
                                            [ ] { } cq l p l e a ) ( 1 ) ( ) (
2 2 2
1 22 p p l - + = +  
 
                                                 
8 Notice that the total number of children in this period is equal to the number of junior adults in period t  times 
n ,   13 
and with  ) 0 (
21 N ,  ) 0 (
22 N  and  ) 0 ( D  given if t is even and  ) 1 (
21 N ,  ) 1 (
22 N  and  ) 1 ( D  given if 
t  is  odd.  Lemma  1,  2  and  3  imply  that  these  parameters  satisfy  the  constraints 
1 0 12 11 < < < a a ,    1 0 22 21 < < < a a ,  ,  1 22 12 21 11 < + < + a a a a   and 




1 21 12 22 11 Î - - = - + + l l e e q p c a a a a p p l l . 
The elements of each column of  M  are positive and sum to 1. So they can be interpreted as 
proportions, or as conditional probabilities for instance for a child of a junior adult with high 
human capital endowment to acquire a high or low human capital, or to die two periods later.  
More precisely, 
21 22 a a -  is the difference between the probabilities for a child to reach a high 
level of human capital if his parent is endowed with high human capital versus if his parent 
has low human capital. 
11 12 a a -  is the difference between the probabilities for a child to reach 
a low level of human capital if his parent has a high human capital endowment versus if his 
parent has low human capital. The difference between the probabilities for a child to die if his 
parent is endowed with high human capital versus if his parent has low human capital is 
( ) ( ) 11 12 21 22 a a a a - - - - .  
Matrix  M  in period  t only depends on health spending set by junior adults,  1 l ,  2 l ,  1
1 + e  and 
2
1 + e . These spending are functions of the values taken by a series of exogenous variables in 
period t: the parameters of the survival functions of children and young adults  A,  B ,  ' B , a  
and b  , the incomes of the junior adults  1 h and  2 h  and the number of their children n.  
 
Equation (21) gives the dynamics of the numbers of junior adults and of the dead,  21 N ,  22 N  
and  D for  2 ³ t , when the values of these variables are given in periods 0 and 1. Equation 
(18) gives the dynamics of the numbers of senior adults  21
1
1 31 ) ( - = N l N p ,   22
1
2 32 ) ( - = N l N p  for 
1 ³ t . Equation (17) gives the dynamics of the number of children with surviving parents, 
31 11 nN N =  and  32 12 nN N =  for  1 ³ t . Finally, the numbers of orphans in period  1 ³ t  are 
given by equations (19)  31
1
21 1 1
1 + + - = nN nN N
o  and  32
1
22 2 1
1 + + - = nN nN N
o . 
We define  D N N P + + =
22 21   as the potential population of junior adults. It would be equal 
to the effective population if all children reached the age of junior adult. Equation (21) shows 
that this potential population grows at rate  n:  nP P = +2 . The number of dead people is equal 
to  the  difference  between  the  potential  population  and  the  number  of  junior  adults:   14 
) (
22 21 N N P D + - = . Thus, we just have to investigate the dynamics of the numbers of living 
junior adults  21 N  and  22 N , which are given by 






















































with  ) 0 (
21 N  and  ) 0 (
22 N  given if t is even and  ) 1 (
21 N  and  ) 1 (
22 N  given if t is odd.  
 
3.2. Characterization of the demographic dynamics  
We  will  assume  in  this  paragraph  that  all  the  parameters  and  exogenous  variables  stay 
constant over time for  0 ³ t . We will also assume that t is even. Then, matrix  ' M  will stay 
constant over time, and the dynamics of the model will be limited to the sizes of the different 
components of population (including the dead). Let us introduce the new variable 
 (23)  0 4 ) ( ) ( 4 ) ( 21 12
2
22 11 21 12 22 11
2
22 11 > + - = - - + º D a a a a a a a a a a  . 
We have the lemma 
Lemma  5.  a)  The  eigenvalues  of  matrix  ' M , 
1 r   and 
2 r ,  are  real  and  such  that 
0 1 2 1 > > > r r . Their expressions are  
(24)  2 / ) ( 22 11 1 D + + = a a r   and  2 / ) ( 22 11 2 D - + = a a r  
 






















V  the right-hand column eigenvectors of   ' M   and 











D + + - D + -
=
21 21
22 11 22 11
2 2 a a
a a a a
V  
1 V  can be normed such that its components are positive and sum to 1.  2 V can be normed such 
that its first component is positive, its second component is negative and the sum of both 
components is equal to 1. 
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W    15 
d) The elements of matrix W  satisfy the constraints  
(27)  0 11 12 > > w w  and  21 22 0 w w < <  
The proof is in the appendix. We can now establish the following crucial proposition which 
neatly characterizes the demographic dynamics and the evolution of human capital (and thus 
income) distributions over time. 
Proposition 1. Assume, to fix the ideas that  ) 0 ( ) 0 (
22 21 N N + =1. Then: 
a) The dynamic paths followed by the sizes of the cohorts of both kinds of junior adults, are 
linear combinations of two geometric series with rates equal to the growth rate of potential 
population n times  the eigenvalues of matrix  ' M . 









21 ) 0 ( ) ( ) 0 ( ) ( ) 2 ( w N w w v n w N w w v n t N
t t + - + + - = +
+ + r r  









22 ) 0 ( ) ( ) 0 ( ) ( ) 2 ( w N w w v n w N w w v n t N
t t + - + + - = +
+ + r r  
In the long run the populations of both kinds of junior adults will grow at a rate equal to the 
growth rate of the  potential population of junior adults times  the largest eigenvalue of 
matrix  ' M  (which is smaller than 1). The long run size of each group depends on the initial 
condition,  ) 0 (
21 N . However, the long run proportions of the two groups of junior adults are 
independent of the initial conditions, and are precisely proportional to the two components of 
the eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue of matrix  ' M . 
 
b) Let us assume that its share of junior adults holding a high level of human capital in the 
initial population is decreased. In the long run, the sizes of both groups of junior adults will 
drop. Along the transition path, the number of junior adults holding a high level of human 
capital and the total size of the population of junior adults will unambiguously go down. In 
contrast, the number of junior adults holding a low level of human capital may increase in the 
short run. 
 
The proof is in the appendix. Proposition 1 has several important implications, which will be 
illustrated in our application to epidemics in the next section. First of all, Property a) shows 
the ability of the model to generate hysteresis. This should not be though seen as a surprising 
result: this is a natural outcome in demographic models: initial demographic shocks are likely 
to have long lasting echo effects. Such effects may be dampened after a while, for example if 
fertility  markedly  changes  some  generations  after  the  initial  shock,  but  it  seems  out  of 
question that persistence is a fundamental property of demographic dynamics. Second, our   16 
model features that an initial change in the income distribution of the population may distort 
this  distribution  in  the  short  and  medium  terms  but  not  in  the  long  run.  This  is  a  very 
important property as we will thereafter. 
4. The demographic and economic effects of epidemics  
We shall study the impact of an epidemic shifting downward the survival probability function 
of young adults (a decrease in  ' B ) whatever their endowment in human capital. We shall only 
consider one-period long epidemics occurring in period 0. Longer epidemiological shocks 
would complicate tremendously the analytical treatment. As we shall see, one-period long 
shocks are enough to capture the main economic and demographic mechanisms at work in the 
model and to identify the distributional outcomes of the epidemic.  
We start from a reference balanced growth path with a total population of junior adults equal 
to 1. If the vector of the initial values of the populations of the two kinds of junior adults is 




































Proposition 1 shows that this steady state is relatively asymptotically stable. We now move to 
our analysis of epidemics. For a better understanding, recall that total domestic output in our 
model is given by  
(31) 
2 22 1 21 ) ( ) ( ) ( h t N h t N t Y + =  . 
The epidemic takes place in period 0 and kills a proportion of junior adults at the end of the 
period.  The number of children alive in period 1 will be unchanged but the proportion of 
orphans among them will be higher. The number of senior adults alive in period 1 will be 
lower as a result of the epidemic.  
Let us investigate the problem at a more formal level. According to lemma 4, as the epidemic 
hits the economy by decreasing parameter B’, junior adults will increase their investment in 
their own health, and their survival rates at the end of the period will decrease by less than 
what results directly from the epidemic. Junior adults will also decrease their investment in 
the health of their children in period 1, which will reduce the survival rate of children in 
period  1,  and  affect  the  size  of  the  population  of  junior  adults  in  period  2.  The  relative   17 
variations in the populations of junior adults holding a low level and a high level of human 
capital, in this period is given by  differentiation of equation (22) 
(32) 
11 1
12 11 11 11
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The following proposition summarises the distributional effects of the epidemic in period 2.  
 
Proposition 2.  a) In period 2 the total population of junior adults decreases. 
b) The proportion of young adults holding a low level of human capital changes under the 
action of two opposite forces. First, the survival rate of children at the end of the first period 
decreases relatively more in poor than in wealthy families. This decreases the proportion of 
junior adults with a low endowment of human capital in period 2. Secondly, the number of 
orphans in period 1 increases in both families. This decreases the proportion of junior adults 
with a low endowment of human capital in period 2. If the first effect dominates, domestic 
output per worker increases, otherwise it decreases. 
c) The numbers of each kind of children and senior adults are unchanged. 
Proof.  See the appendix. 
 
When an epidemic takes place, parents will spend less on the health of their children. This 
will  contribute  to  decreasing  the  proportion  of  children  who  will  survive  in  period  2. 
Moreover, more children will grow as orphans whose the probability of survival is lower. 
Both effects lead to a decrease in the population of young adults in period 2.    18 
The proportion of children surviving at the end of period 1 decreases by a lower percentage if 
their parents are wealthy than if they are poor. Children of wealthy parents have a higher 
probability of reaching a high level of human capital than the children of poor parents. Thus, 
this first mechanism leads to an increase in the proportion of young adults with a high level of 
human capital in period 2. In period 2, the number of junior adults who were orphans will 
increase and the number of those who were brought up by their parents will decrease. Orphans 
have a lower probability to reach a high level of human capital. Thus, this second mechanism 
leads to a decrease in the proportion of young adults with a high level of human capital in 
period 2. 
 Proposition  2  is  a  crucial  characterisation  of  the  medium  term  distributional  effects  of 
epidemics. The distributional consequences are significant in the medium run. If the second 
mechanism  dominates,  more  young  adults  will  get  less  educated  two  periods  after  the 
epidemic  and output per worker goes down. However, the epidemic has no effect on the 
number of children and old adults living in period 2. Thus, the share of the active population 
in the total population decreases. So output per capita decreases by a higher proportion than 
output  per  worker.  The  economy  is  clearly  impoverished  (with  respect  to  the  reference 
balanced growth path) at this time horizon. If the first mechanism dominates, more young 
adults will get more educated two periods after the epidemic and output per worker goes up. 
In this case, the effect on output per capita is ambiguous.  
The analysis of even periods, posterior to period 2, can easily be deduced from Proposition 1. 
If the composition per skill of the population of junior adults in period 2 were unchanged, then 
the population of junior adults and the output of the economy would follow a balanced path 
parallel to but lower than the original one. However, as the number of children and old adults 
living  in  these  periods  has  not  been  modified  by  the  economics,  output  per  capita  will 
permanently be under its value before the epidemic. If the proportion of young adults with low 
skill in period 2 has increased, then this proportion will progressively decreases over time and 
finally converge to its initial value. During this transition output per worker will be lower than 
if the epidemic has not taken place. In the long run, output per worker will converge to its 
initial value, but output per capita will be lower. If the proportion of young adults with low 
skill in period 2 has decreased, then this proportion will progressively increase over time and 
converge to its initial value. During this transition output per worker will be higher than if the 
epidemic had not taken place. In the long run, output per worker will converge to its initial 
value.   19 
A similar analysis can be done for odd periods. In period 1, the number of old adults has 
decreased because of the epidemic, but the numbers of children and of young adults of both 
skills is unchanged. So, output per worker is unchanged but output per capita has increased. In 
the following odd periods, the number of old adults and of children has decreased but the 
number of young adults of both kinds is unchanged. So, still output per worker is unchanged 
but output per capita has increased.  
 
So, in contrast to some contributions in the AIDS-related literature (like Bell et al., 2003), the 
model predicts a kind of corrective dynamics which will bring some key variables to the 
corresponding balanced growth corresponding values, although some demographic variables 
will be permanently affected as already mentioned in Proposition 1.  
 
Further results 
In addition to the analysis of the distributional consequences of epidemics highlighted in the 
previous  section,  the  model  has  several  predictions  on  other  demographic  and  economic 
variables which are worth a look having in mind the recent AIDS empirical literature. We 
select three indicators to make the point. 
a)  Population size: Population decreases in all periods and this effect is permanent. 
This is consistent with empirical studies. For instance in the 2004 United Nations 
report, the predictions point rather at a sharp fall in total population by 2020 in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (38 countries), about 14% less than without AIDS. 
b)  Age pyramid: In the short run (t=0), the epidemics implies a reduction in the 
proportion of young adults, which is also a key economic implications since these 
adults are also the workers of the economy. In the medium run (period 1) it is the 
proportion of old adults, which decreases. This is still consistent with the available 
AIDS projection. The projections included in the 2004 United Nations report for 
Botswana show up a huge effect on the age structure of its population by 2025: 
more than half of the potential population aged 35-59 would have been lost to 
AIDS. This proportion is much lower for the older and younger populations.  
c)  Output and productivity: In period 1, output per worker is the same as if the 
epidemic had not taken place, but output per capita has increased. This results from 
the assumption that the epidemic has lasted for only one period and has not hit   20 
children. However, in period 2, output per worker may decrease or increase. In the 
first case, output per capita decreases, in the second case we cannot conclude.   
 
5. Conclusion  
In this paper, we have presented a full analytical dynamic theory of income distribution under 
epidemics. A peculiarity of the theory with respect to the usual set-ups is the neutralization of 
the wage and fertility effects typically invoked, allowing for the isolation and the inspection of 
new transmission mechanisms of the epidemiological shocks. Within this framework, we have 
analytically shown several properties. First, transitory epidemiological shocks have permanent 
effects on the size of population and on the level of output. However and more importantly, 
the income distribution is shown to be unaltered in the long-run. Second, we show that this 
distribution  can  be  seriously  altered  in  the  medium-term  due  to  two  clearly  identified 
mechanisms, and in particular to the ability of orphans to access high levels of education. The 
sharply rising number of orphans is therefore of crucial importance: if not conveniently treated 
(for  example  by  internationally  funded  social  and  specially  education  aid  programs  for 
orphans), this problem is likely to induce a sharp worsening of poverty in the medium run. 
Of course, the mechanisms isolated in this paper are not the unique relevant in the analysis of 
the socio-economic impact of epidemics. We have already mentioned the possible wage and 
fertility effects. It is not obvious at all how these effects interact in reality, and what could be 
(or  could  have  been)  their  relative  significance  in  concrete  epidemic  episodes.  We  are 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Lemma 4 
 a) The eigenvalues of matrix  ' M  are the roots of the characteristic equation  
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( 21 12 22 11 22 11
2 = - + + - º L a a a a a a S r r  
The discriminant of this equation is  0 > D . So, the two eigenvalues of  ' M  are distinct and 
real. Their product is given by  ] [ 1 , 0 ) 0 ( 21 12 22 11 Î - º a a a a S . Moreover we have  
21 12 22 11 21 12 22 11 22 11 ) 1 )( 1 ( ) ( ) ( 1 ) 1 ( a a a a a a a a a a S - - - = - + + - º  
As  we  have 
21 11 1 a a > -   and 
12 22 1 a a > - ,  we  can  conclude  that  0 ) 1 ( > S .  Thus,  the  two 
eigenvalues of matrix  ' M  are strictly included between 0 and 1.  
 
b) We have 
( ) 2 / 21 22 11 21 1 21 22 11 21 v a a v v a v a D + + = = + r , so  
( ) 21 22 11 11 21 2 v a a v a D + - =  
We also have  
( ) 22 22 11 12 21 2 v a a v a D - - =    23 
So, a determination of the eigenvectors is given by equation (25). The two components of  1 V  
are positive and we can norm this eigenvector by setting  1 21 11 = +v v . Moreover the sum of the 
two components of  2 V  is positive and we can norm this eigenvector by setting  1 22 12 = + v v  
 
c) We deduce from  I VW =  
1 ) ( ) )( ( 21 11 21 11 22 11 = + D + - - w w w w a a  
0 ) ( ) )( ( 22 12 22 12 22 11 = + D + - - w w w w a a  
0 ) ( 2 21 11 21 = - w w a  




























w   
 
d)  The inequalities are easy to check. For example, 
11 12 w w >   is equivalent to 
  ) ( 2 22 11 21 a a a - + > D . A sufficient condition for this inequality is 
  ) ( 4 ) ( 4 ) ( 22 11 21 21
2
11 22 21 12
2
22 11 a a a a a a a a a a - + + - > + - º D , or  
21 11 22 12 a a a a + > + , which is true.  □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
 a) Let P  be the diagonal matrix with elements 
1 r  and 
2 r . Then (22) can be rewritten 
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In the long run, under  1 ) 0 ( ) 0 (
2 2 = +
- + N N , we have 
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+ r  





22 ) 0 ( ) ( / ) 2 ( w N w w v n t N
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t + - ® +
¥ ®
+ r  
This establishes directly property a).  
 
b) We deduce from equation (28) and (29) the dynamics of the total population of junior 
adults   24 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 22
21








) 0 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ( ) ( ) (
) 2 ( ) 2 (
w N w w v v n w N w w v v n
t N t N
t t + - + + + - +
= + + +
+ + r r
 
We know from Lemma 5d that  0 11 12 > > w w , and  21 22 0 w w < < . Lemma 5b establishes that 
0 , , 12 21 11 > v v v ,  0 22 < v , and  0 22 12 > +v v  also hold.   
Then, we notice that, if  ) 0 (
22 N  is decreased, that is if  ) 0 (
21 N  is increased, then  ) 2 (
22 + t N  
goes down.   
As  2 1 r r > ,  ) 2 ( ) 2 (
22 21 + + + t N t N  drops too if  
0 ) )( ( ) )( ( 22 21 22 12 12 11 21 11 ³ - + + - + w w v v w w v v . The expressions of matrices  V and  W given 
in Lemma 5 show that the left-hand side of this inequality is equal to 0.  
However, we do not know if  ) 2 (
21 + t N  increases or decreases. Indeed, by the same reasoning 
as just before, this figure would go down if   0 ) ( ) ( 22 21 12 12 11 11 £ - + - w w v w w v .  Unfortunately 
this expression turns out to be equal to 1. Therefore anything could happen in the short run as 
for the number of low human capital junior adults. □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
a) We deduce from the expressions of the elementrs of matrix  ' M  and from lemma 4  






1 21 11 < - + + - = + - = + + + + l d c e e d c c l c c l e d a a d p l l p p l  
A similar computation shows that  ( ) 0 22 12 < +a a d . Then, equation (34) establishes part a of 
the proposition.  
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a v a v
da v da v
a v a v










= - .  This 
expression has the same sign as 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] { }
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] { } 22 12 11 11 11 12 22 11 21 11 11
21 12 11 11 11 11 22 11 21 11 11
1 1 1
1 1
da a v a v da a v a v v
da a v a v da a v a v v
- + - - + - +
- + - - +
 
We use (25) to substitute for  11 v . This expression has the same sign as 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] { }
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] { } 22 12 21 11 22 11 12 22 21 21 22 11 21
21 12 21 11 22 11 11 22 21 21 22 11 22 11
2 2 2
2 2
da a a a a a da a a a a a a
da a a a a a da a a a a a a a
+ D + - - + D + - +
+ D + - - + D + - D + -
 
or   25 
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which is equal to 
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We deduce from equation (21) 
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11 1 1 l d
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e










l + + - - = - - - - - = -  












12 1 1 l d
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e



































































The above expression as the same sign as   26 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
( )
( )






























































































1 21 12 22 11 l l e e q p c a a a a p p l l - - = - + + . The previous expression 
has the same sign as 
( ) ( ) [ ]( ) { } ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) [ ] { } ( )









- - D + - +
- D + - - + D + + -





















2 1 2 1










) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 2
) ( ) ( ) ( 2





l l e e a a
l d l l e a a cq p a a a
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p p l l
p p p l
l
p p p l l
 
As  ( ) 0
1 < l dp , the first term is positive if  
[ ]( )
[ ] ) ( / ) ( 2 2 ) ( / ) ( / ) ( 2













+ + + + +
+
- = - =
- - > D + +
e e a a e a e a e
cq p l l e a a
l l l l l
p p l
 




1 21 22 11 + + - > D + - e e a a a l l , 
which is true because the left-hand side is positive and the right-hand side is negative. 
As  ( ) 0
2 < l dp , the second term of the expression is positive. 
























, the second term of the expression is 
negative.□ 